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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of risks and returns of socially responsi-
ble investing (SRI) utilizing firm-level data on corporate social responsibility ratings. We
demonstrate that firms with high ratings have significantly higher, albeit temporary and
time varying, alphas than those with low ratings. In an event study setting, we find that
reductions in firms’ social responsibility ratings lead to significantly lower cumulative ab-
normal returns that dissipate after the second year. We then provide evidence indicating
that these differences are induced by time-varying, wealth-dependent shocks to investors’
preferences, which result in highly rated stocks behaving in a fashion akin to luxury goods.
The alpha difference between stocks with high and low ratings are significantly more pro-
nounced during good economic times, and is significantly correlated with both luxury con-
sumption from NIPA and the sales growth of luxury-good retailers.
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1. Introduction
The practice of socially responsible investing (SRI) has received tremendous attention from
both market participants and academic researchers in multiple disciplines. Despite a large lit-
erature in sociology and business ethics that studies the origin and proliferation of SRI, few
papers in finance examine the link between SRI and stock returns at the firm level, with ex-
isting papers having seemingly divergent results. On one hand, Geczy, Stambaugh, and Levin
(2005) find that under a specific belief structure, investing in SRI mutual funds incurs a signif-
icant penalty in certainty-equivalent returns compared to mutual funds without such a focus.
Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) also show that “sin” firms with substantial business interests in al-
cohol, tobacco and gambling industries earn significantly higher alphas than comparable firms
in other industries. In contrast, both Kempf and Osthoff (2007) and Statman and Glushkov
(2009) find that portfolios consisting of stocks with higher corporate social responsibility (CSR)
ratings have significantly higher alphas, while Edmans (2011) demonstrate that, once firms are
listed in the “100 Best Companies to Work For in America” by the Fortune magazine, they earn
higher alphas.
This paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the returns and risks of investing in so-
cially responsible firms. We utilize a unique firm-level dataset on corporate social responsibility
ratings, published by MSCI-ESG STATS (formerly known as the KLD database). This dataset
provides annual ratings of large publicly traded firms on over 100 CSR-related criteria. To pro-
vide a framework for our analysis, we first develop three distinct scenarios governing the be-
havior of realized returns of stocks with different levels of social responsibility. First, we argue
that unexpected positive shocks to investors’ preferences toward SRI lead to higher short-term
realized alphas for stocks with higher SR ratings. By contrast, unexpected firm expenditures
in SR-related activities might divert resources away from shareholders, and are thus associ-
ated with lower alphas. Finally, if SRI represents only inconsequential marketing gimmicks or
measurement errors, then it would not be significantly related to any alpha difference.
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We analyze our hypotheses using two approaches. In both cases, we use the firm-level
ratings data and aggregate the ratings into eight individual Category SR Scores, as well as one
Overall SR Score, then perform the following two tests: First, we sort our sample into decile
portfolios based on the SR Scores, and compare the average monthly alphas of the top and
bottom portfolios. Second, for each stock in our sample, we examine the change in returns
in response to changes in SR Scores by comparing the cumulative abnormal returns before
and after SR Score decreases of two or more deciles. Our first test provides support for our
first hypothesis: (1) the Fama-French four-factor alphas are significantly higher for firms in
the top decile portfolios (“good” firms) than those in the bottom decile, ranging from 0.15%
per month (Overall SR) to 0.44% per month (Governance), (2) The alphas are temporary and
time-varying. While overall high-SR firms have higher alphas, the focus of SRI with respect to
specific sub-topics evolves through time: the average alpha difference between top and bottom
decile portfolios in the Environment category, for example, is significantly positive prior to
2003, but dissipates afterwards. Precisely around the same time, the alpha difference in the
Governance category changes from zero to significantly positive. Even at the overall level,
the alpha difference reverses during bad economic times such as the recent financial crisis.
Our second test then shows that, after reductions in SR Scores, average abnormal returns are
significantly negative in the following year. However, the negative alphas again dissipate after
the second year.
Having established the main empirical facts that high-SR stocks exhibit higher, albeit tem-
porary and time-varying, alphas, we explore the economic mechanism that could give rise to
these patterns. In particular, we argue that temporary, wealth-dependent preference shocks
result in high-SR stocks behaving in a fashion akin to luxury goods. Suppose that high- and
low-SR stocks are similar in all cash flow-related aspects. During good economic times, house-
holds have greater financial wealth and can consequently afford to be SRI-conscious. This
drives up demand for high-SR stocks, resulting in higher realized alphas. By contrast, during
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bad times, households face more binding wealth constraints and therefore have to pull back
on their “social consciousness” and revert to investments that deliver the best risk-adjusted
returns. This reduces the demand for high-SR stocks, thereby decreasing and even reversing
the alpha spreads between high- and low-SR stocks.
Our next set of tests provides evidence consistent with this mechanism. First, we pro-
duce two ex-ante forecasts of good economic times–periods when long-term P/E ratios or GDP
growth projections are in the upper half of their respective 10-year rolling distributions. We
demonstrate that, compared to both low- and medium-SR stocks, high-SR stocks earn much
higher alphas during good times, and much lower alphas during bad times. We then directly
compare the performance of SRI with that of luxury goods consumption: In our sample period
of 1993-2013, the (good-bad) alpha spread is highly correlated with per capita consumption
in jewelry and watches from NIPA (correlation coefficient=0.528). In addition, similar to Aït-
Sahalia, Parker, and Yogo (2004), we construct the real sales growth of a portfolio of US luxury
retailers (e.g. Tiffany, Gucci, etc.) The alpha spread is also significantly correlated with real
luxury sales with a coefficient of 0.329. By contrast, the cash flow characteristics, such as
earnings on book equity, are not significantly different between high- and low-SR stocks dur-
ing either good or bad times.
Our results seem surprising given the findings from papers such as Geczy et al. (2005),
who show that under a particular belief structure, investing strictly in mutual funds that self-
identify as SRI would realize returns that range from 0.31% to 15% lower than without such
a restriction. To reconcile this difference, we first show that these funds probably use bench-
marks other than MSCI ratings: despite the funds self-identifying as SRI, they did not actually
allocate more toward stocks with high SR ratings according to the MSCI definition. Second,
unconditionally, there is no statistically significant difference in alphas between the SRI and
Non-SRI fund portfolios. Therefore, under the MSCI definition, the self reported SRI mutual
funds are similar to other funds in their investment objectives and unconditional performances.
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Therefore, using the MSCI definition, we could not find discernable performance differences
from mutual funds to support the alternative hypothesis of (costly) SRI initiatives.
Our results thus indicate that the performance wedge between “good” and “bad” stocks are
probably more attributable to the demand side, i.e. to the shifting of investors’ SRI preferences,
rather than to cash-flow-related explanations e.g. firms using SRI as advertising to differenti-
ate their products or avoid future regulatory penalties. The luxury-good-like performance of
SRI suggests that such preference shifts are related to aggregate wealth. We rationalize these
arguments in the upcoming version of the paper featuring a model with wealth-dependent
investor preferences.
Our findings have several important implications for investment management and corpo-
rate governance. First, we demonstrate that, contrary to popular beliefs, at the individual stock
level, it is possible to “do well while doing good” by investing in high-SR stocks in multiple cat-
egories and realizing higher alphas. This suggests additional growth room for well-designed,
differentiated SRI-focused investment products. Second, our hypothesis that the higher alphas
are due to temporary demand shocks suggest that in order for the out-performance by high-
SR firms to persist, the definition of CSR should continuously evolve and new areas of CSR
“hot spots” need to be discovered. Our multi-faceted Scores encompass a wide range of SR
categories and therefore can potentially be an appropriate instrument to detect such changes.
Third, because SRI alphas behave like luxury goods, SRI investing is likely to be very cyclical.
Our results provide indications of critical turning points where the investors’ preferences are
likely to shift, thus provide guidance on the optimal timing of CSR-related expenditures and
marketing activities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes our sample and data
sources. Section 3.1 develops our main hypotheses. Section 3 reports the results of our empir-
ical tests. Section 5 concludes.
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2. Data
2.1. Social Responsibility Ratings Data
We obtain our data on social responsibility ratings from the MSCI ESG STATS (hereafter re-
ferred to as ESGSTATS) database,1 which is a comprehensive, annual data set of ratings on
more than 100 criteria related to corporate social responsibility practices by large publicly
traded companies. The ratings data are published near the end of each calendar year, starting
in 1991. Our sample uses 20 years of data from 1991 to 2011. The universe of companies
covered by ESGSTATS varies by time: S&P 500 companies from 1991 to 2000, Russell 1000
companies from 2001 to 2002, and Russell 3000 companies from 2003 onwards.2
The social responsibility ratings for each firm are constructed as follows. First, eight major
categories related to corporate social responsibility are identified. The categories are desig-
nated to measure the firm’s externality on stakeholders other than regular shareholders in a
specific field, such as:
• Community: the firm’s relation to and its impact on the community
• Diversity: practices that effects racial and gender diversity in firm and the community
• Employment: labor relations, hiring practices and employee satisfaction
• Environment: the firm’s environmental impact such as energy use or carbon footprint
• Governance: investor relations, transparency in management, moral hazard problems
• Human Right: practices that promote or harm human rights
• Product: general product quality, and impact of the firm’s products on society and envi-
ronment
1Prior to 2011, the database was maintained by KLD and known as the KLD Social Ratings Database. Available
at http://www.msci.com/products/esg/stats/, and also at Wharton Research Data Services
2The Domini Social 400 index members are also included, and this has substantial overlap with the S&P 500
constituents.
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• Sin: concerns related to alcohol, tobacco, gambling, and pornographic industries
Within each category are a series of criteria, designated as either strengths or concerns. For
each specific criterion, the MSCI conducts independent research, using both publicly available
information such as news, SEC filings and lawsuit records, as well as proprietary method such
as surveys and managerial interviews. It then makes a true/false evaluation for each criterion.
We reproduce two criteria in the Environment category as an example:
• Pollution Prevention (Strength): This indicator measures a firm’s method of mitigating non-
carbon air emissions, water discharges, and solid waste from its operations. Factors affecting
this evaluation include, but are not limited to, initiatives to reduce a firm’s non-carbon air
emissions from its operations; to reduce the release of raw sewage, industrial chemicals, and
other regulated substances; to reduce hazardous and non-hazardous waste; and programs
to reduce the use of packaging materials, to support recycling; and to recycle old products
such as televisions and other consumer electronics.
• Substantial Emissions (Concern): This indicator measures a firm’s emission of toxic chem-
icals according to data from the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), a U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) database of information on toxic chemical releases and waste manage-
ment activities. Factors affecting this evaluation include, but are not limited to, how the firm
compares to its industry peers.
The evaluation process results in a series of binary scores, each corresponding to a single
criterion. To further consolidate the ratings, we compute firm-level Social Responsibility Scores
(SR Scores hereafter). For each category c listed in the above paragraph, we compute the
Category SR Score as
Scorect =
s∑
j=1
I jtStrength
c
j −
w∑
k=1
Ikt Weakness
c
k
= No. of Strengths in category c − No. of Weaknesses in category c, (1)
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where I jt is a binary indicator that equals to 1 if a the firm exhibits a particular strength/weakness
in the social responsibility category. Similarly, we compute the Overall SR Score as the sum of
individual category scores:
Scoreoveral lt =
8∑
c=1
Scorect . (2)
Note that, while in practice, some investors place more weight on certain categories over
others (e.g. and exclusively avoiding sin stocks), we choose to be agnostic with respect to
specific categories in computing the Overall SR Score, treating each individual SR category
equally. As such, the Overall SR Score will be affected by “big” categories with a larger number
of criteria (e.g. Environment and Product, compared to the Sin category which has only one
criterion).
We compile the top 10 and bottom 10 firms in terms of the Overall SR Score each year,
and report the results from the years of 1993 and 2010 in Panel A of Table 1. We choose these
two years as an example because they represent two different eras with different values and
attitudes towards corporate social responsibility. Two observations are in order: first, the top
and bottom firms frequently involve household names, often coinciding with well published
cases related to corporate social responsibility.3 Second, some firms remain in top/bottom
spots despite the two sample years being 17 years apart. In fact, the SR scores are quite
persistent over time. For each firm, we compute the annual AR(1) coefficients for the Overall
SR Score and the Category SR Scores, and report the mean and standard deviation of the
coefficient across firms in Panel B of Table 1.4 The Scores are very persistent for the Diversity,
Environment, Human Right and Sin categories, and less so for the Governance and Product
categories. This finding suggests the interaction of two effects: first, many firms are consistent
3For example, Whole Foods Market has been known for selling organic and locally-sourced products, while Mc-
Donnell Douglas was investigated by for Department of Justice in 1993 for overcharging the government on
billion-dollar military contracts. In 2010, Estee Lauder is commented for banning the use of animals in its prod-
uct testing while Monsanto is alleged by media to provide potentially harmful genetically-modified crops.
4To mitigate changes in rating criteria over time, we compute the AR(1) coefficients using the percentile rankings
of the firm within a given year, rather than using the raw SR scores.
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in their corporate social responsibility practices. Second, preference toward SRI probably has
shifted over time. The second effect has important asset pricing implications, which we further
explore in Section 3.1.
2.2. Other Data Sources
We obtain all stock return data from CRSP and firm-level accounting data from Compustat. Ta-
ble 2 reports the summary statistics of the top and bottom decile firms sorted by the Overall SR
Score, and by the eight individual Category SR Scores. Firms in the top and bottom deciles are
similar in most pricing- and cash flow-related characteristics. For example, the Overall Decile
1 and Decile 10 portfolios have similar values in size, book-to-market, P/E, dividend payout,
and leverage ratios. Within the individual SR categories, the only noticeable differences are in
terms of size: firms with high scores in Community, Employment and Human Right are on av-
erage larger than those with low scores in these categories. The top and bottom firms in other
categories are similar in all characteristics including size. Because the cash flow statistics are
similar for firms in the top and bottom deciles, any potential difference in return characteristics
(e.g. alphas) is more likely to be a result from changes in preferences, rather than from the
cash flow channel.
3. Empirical Facts: Alpha Differences between High and Low-SR Stocks
3.1. Hypothesis Development: Why Would Different SR Stocks Have Different Alphas?
This section formulates our main hypotheses regarding the alphas of stocks with different SR
ratings. First, differences in alphas can emanate from unexpected shocks to investor’s prefer-
ences. Anecdotal evidence suggests that investors have become more receptive toward CSR
practices that have positive externality on other stakeholders.5 In addition, consumers have
5For example, the US Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment (USSIF) reports that as of 2012, the
total assets invested according to socially responsible criteria is $3.74 trillion, or roughly 11% of the total assets
under professional management, compared to $639 billion/9% in 1995.
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become more conscientious about purchasing products with positive social and environmen-
tal impact.6 If such demand shocks are not expected by investors ex-ante, this would lead to
higher realized stock returns for firms with higher SR ratings. In the long term, as the prefer-
ence shocks become known by the market, the difference in returns will converge toward zero.
However, the short-term mispricing could persist if there is a sequence of positive preference
shocks over time (e.g. to different categories of SR), leading to higher realized stock returns for
firms with high overall SR ratings. We summarize our reasoning in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 In the presence of unexpected preference shocks that favor high-SR firms, the alphas
of such firms will be higher than those of low-SR firms. The difference in alphas could persist with
a sequence of such unexpected preference shocks, before eventually converge toward zero.
An alternative hypothesis is that, if a firm takes actions to enhance its corporate social
responsibility, it may require higher costs than comparable firms without such activities. Al-
ternatively, Cheng, Hong, and Shue (2014) demonstrate that firms might shift resources away
from shareholders to other stakeholders. As such, CSR is potentially a costly endeavor. If the
cost is not expected by investors ex-ante, the realized returns will be lower in the short term for
firms that engage in such activity. In the long term, again as the market learns of such shocks,
the expected return differences will adjust toward zero. This prediction is partly reflected by
findings in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009), and results in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 In the presence of unexpected costly expenditures undertaken to enhance corporate
social responsibility, the alphas of high SR firms will be lower than those of low-SR firms. The
difference in alphas converges toward zero in the long term.
It could also be argued that CSR and SRI practices are only fads or marketing strategies
6For example, the market share of hybrid vehicles in the US has grown from 0.06% in 2010 to 3.20% in 2013,
according to Department of Energy statistics. Also according to industry data, the market share of eggs produced
in a cage-free environment has grown from 1.5% in 2000 to over 5% in 2013, despite higher shelf prices.
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designed to garner media attention, and have no real impact on either stakeholders or the
society as a whole. Therefore, rational consumers and market participants pay no attention
to these activities regardless of their preferences toward “true” SRI. In addition, the SR Scores
that we use could contain large measurement errors and, in extreme cases, do not measure
true CSR activities at all. In both cases, the realized returns of firms with different SR Scores
would be similar.
Hypothesis 3 In the absence of either unexpected preference shocks or unexpected SR expendi-
tures, or if the SR Scores contain large measurement errors, then the alphas of high SR firms
would be the same as those of low-SR firms.
Ex-ante, the expected returns are the same for high- and low-SR stocks under all three sce-
narios above, despite the differences in realized returns. We now formulate a framework where
the expected returns are different. Suppose that, firms’ production functions contain stochas-
tic shocks related to SR activities. An example of such shock would be uncertain regulatory
actions faced by producers of alternative energy, or increased output volatility due to product
sourcing from low-emission suppliers. Because such shocks are captured by the production
function, if they are recognized by market participants, they represent a source of risk. High-
SR firms therefore earn higher risk premia as compensation for exposure to such SR-related
risks. As a result, the expected returns for high-SR firms will be higher than their low-SR coun-
terparts. In addition, if researchers cannot measure such stochastic shocks directly from the
data, the higher expected returns will translate to higher alphas in traditional asset pricing
models, irrespective of whether unexpected shocks are present.
Hypothesis 4 If CSR activities are associated with stochastic shocks to the firms’ production, and
market participants recognize these shocks, then firms with high SR ratings will command higher
expected returns than low SR firms. These larger returns for high SR firms will appear as positive
alphas if researchers do not control for such cost risk factors.
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It is worth noting that, even though both Hypotheses 1 and 4 prescribe higher alphas for
high-SR stocks, the persistence these alphas are different. Under Hypothesis 1, the alphas are
temporary and converges to zero in the long run. Under Hypothesis 4, because the “alphas”
are essentially mismeasured betas, they are permanent. Thus, we can disentangle these two
different sources of alphas by explicitly identifying temporary preference shocks and trying to
isolate the permanence of the alphas with respect to such shocks.7
We test the above hypotheses using two different approaches. First, we sort our sample
into decile portfolios based on the Overall and Category SR Scores, and compare the average
monthly alphas of the top and bottom portfolios. Next, for each stock in our sample, we
examine the change in returns in response to changes in SR Scores by comparing the cumulative
abnormal returns before and after SR Score decreases.
3.2. High SR Stocks Have Higher Alphas
For each Category SR Score and the Overall Score, we sort our sample into deciles according
to the Score and form 10 equally-weighted portfolios per category. We also construct a long-
short portfolio (1-10) for each category by substrating the Decile 10 (high SR scores) portfolio
returns from Decile 1 (low SR scores) returns. Next, for each month t, category c, and decile
d = 1, · · · , 10 (also the long-short portfolios), we fit the following rolling four-factor regression:
rc,d − r f = αc,d,t + βmktc,d,t(MKT − r f ) + β smbc,d,tSMB + βhmlc,d,t HM L + βumdc,d,t MOM + ε, (3)
where rc,d is the decile portfolio return and MKT , SMB, HM L and MOM are the corresponding
Fama-French and momentum factors. For each month t, we use return and factor data from
the previous 36 months to estimate the alphas and betas. Panel A of Table 3 reports, by SR
Score category, the average alphas for the Decile 1 and 10 portfolios, as well as the long-short
portfolio. Panel B of the same table reports the corresponding betas for the long-short portfolio
7In on going work, we incorporate textual analysis-based methods that identify key events related to different SR
categories at the firm level and then examine the persistence in alphas.
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in each category. We further explore the return differences between the Overall Score deciles
in Fig. 1, where the top panel plots the time series of monthly alphas for Decile 1 and Decile
10 portfolios, and the bottom panel displays the time series of average Overall SR Score of the
two portfolios.
Both Fig. 1 and Table 3 show consistent and statistically significant differences in four-
factor alphas between low- and high-SR portfolios in several categories. For example, Decile
1 (low SR) firms in the Environment category on average have an alpha 0.32% lower per
month than that for Decile 10 (high SR) firms. Similar spreads can also be seen in the Gov-
ernance (0.44% per month), Product (0.32% per month) categories and the Overall SR Score
(0.15% per month). This is consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 4 that either preference shocks
or stochastic shocks to firms’ production lead to higher alphas for high-SR firms. Anecdotally,
the three individual SR categories that exhibit statistically significant alpha differences also
constitute the bulk of the investing criteria used by professional money managers. According
to the aforementioned USSIF report, four out of seven top SRI considerations for institutional
investors are related to Environment, Governance, and Product categories.8
With regard to the time series, Fig. 1 shows that the alpha difference between high and
low Overall SR Score firms is consistent over time.9 Except for a brief period between 2008
and 2010, the alphas for the Decile 10 portfolio is consistently higher than that of the Decile
1 portfolio. The bottom panel also demonstrates a similar story for the actual SR scores: the
Decile 1 average Overall Score remains consistently negative and is either unchanged or very
slowly drifting downwards, while the Decile 10 Overall Score seems to have a very slow upward
trend over time. These findings lead us to reject Hypotheses 2 and 3 in the previous section.
8USSIF reports “Top 10 ESG Considerations for Institutional Investors” in 2012. Out of the top 10 criteria, three
are not covered by our SR categories (Iran, Northern Ireland and other terrorist regimes). Among the seven
remaining criteria, three are related to Governance (executive pay , board issues and political contributions),
and one is related to Environment and Product (climate change and carbon footprint). The remaining criteria
(Sudan) is related to Human Rights, our result for which is not statistically significant.
9The same pattern can be seem for the other three categories as well as the Human Right category.
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3.3. These Alphas Are Temporary
Next, we examine the source of alpha difference between high- and low-SR firms, disentan-
gling Hypotheses 1 and 4. Hypothesis 1 ascribes the alpha difference to temporary preference
shocks, whereas Hypothesis 4 attributes this to risk premia for SR-related risks not measured
by the researcher. Under Hypothesis 1, in order for the overall alpha differences to persist,
new SRI “hot spots” must be discovered over time such that as the alpha difference in one
SRI area dissipates, the preference shocks are transferred to a new area, leading to continued
alpha differences. In Fig. 3, we plot the timeseries of the long-short (high SR-low SR) portfolio
alphas in the three SR categories with statistically significant alpha differences (from Panel A
of Table 3): Environment, Governance, and Product. Here, we see a clear transition between
SR categories. Prior to 2003, both Environment and Product categories exhibit significantly
positive alphas. However, those alphas quickly dissipate afterwards. Interestingly, precisely
around the same time, the Governance category, which has zero alphas before, starts to ex-
hibit significant positive alphas. Anecdotally, this transition corresponds to the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002, which has put renewed public focus on corporate governance and
disclosure, after a series of high-profile scandals. Our results therefore suggests that overall
positive the SRI alphas has shifted from environment/product to corporate governance around
2003.
3.3.1. Relation to Previous Results
In contrast to our results, findings in both Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) and Geczy et al. (2005)
provide partial support for Hypothesis 2. First, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) construct a static
portfolio of firms with substantial business interests in alcohol, tobacco and gambling indus-
tries. They find that such firms, which overlap our bottom decile firms in the Sin category, earn
significantly higher alphas than comparable firms in other industries in the 1964-2004 period.
In contrast, while firms in our bottom Sin decile do have higher alphas in the 1993-2011 period
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than those in the top decile, the difference is not statistically significant. Our different results
can partly be explained by different composition of the Sin portfolios. In Hong and Kacperczyk
(2009), the portfolio is selected based on NAICS/Fama-French industry codes and Compustat
segment data. As a result, it consists of companies whose sole business, or the majority of its
business, falls within the Sin category. Our Sin portfolio is selected using a much wider set of
criteria and, as a result, includes companies not necessarily in the Sin industries/segments but
conduct business related to Sin firms in some form, e.g. the supplier of ingredients used in al-
cohol production. Our Sin portfolio is therefore much larger than that in Hong and Kacperczyk
(2009) and have potentially different return profiles depending on investor preferences over
specific Sin criteria.10
In addition, Geczy et al. (2005) utilize a specific belief structure where investors have fixed
prior beliefs about fund managers’ skills and about accuracy of various pricing models, then
update their beliefs according to fund returns generated from a pricing model that incorporates
additional factors that are latent in Fama-French but co-vary with traditional Fama-French and
momentum factors.11 Next, investors form ex-ante efficient portfolios by adjusting their mu-
tual fund holdings to maximize overall Sharpe ratios. Geczy et al. (2005) find that, under
such a structure, if investors restrict their universe to only SRI funds, then those who believe
in the Fama-French pricing model require a certainty-equivalent monthly return that ranges
from 0.31% to 15% lower than investors without such a restriction. They report no difference
in required returns for investors who believe in the CAPM. While the finding for Fama-French
believers seems to support the alternative hypothesis of SRI being a costly endeavor, our re-
sults in Table 3 indicate that this might not necessarily be the case at the individual firm level.
To reconcile the two sets of results, we conduct two tests. We first obtain from CRSP quar-
10Another difference between the samples is that our Sin portfolio include firms doing business with the pornogra-
phy industry, which comprise roughly 10% of the portfolio. In addition, in untabulated results, we also extend
the sample in Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) from 2004 to 2011. We find a mildly higher alpha for the sin
portfolio. Detailed results are available upon request.
11Specifically, GSL use four additional factors, which are the four principal components constructed from 20
value-weighted industry portfolios.
14
terly data on portfolio holdings of the self-identified SRI mutual funds covered in Geczy et al.
(2005), hereafter referred to as the GSL sample, as well as holdings data from a control sam-
ple of non-SRI, no-load equity mutual funds, from 2002-2011.12 Then, for each portfolio in
the two samples, we construct the quarterly portfolio-level SR Score as the holding-percentage-
weighted average of SR Scores of all individual stocks covered by by the ESGSTAT database. We
then plot the time series of mean Overall SR Score for the GSL and control samples in Fig. 2.13
This figure shows that the Overall SR Score is very similar between the GSL and control sam-
ples in the 2002-2011 period. The finding suggests that, despite the funds self-identifying as
SRI, they did not actually allocate more toward stocks with high SR ratings according to the
MSCI definition. Second, to assess the average performance of SRI and other mutual funds, we
form equally-weighted portfolios of the SRI funds reported by Geczy et al. (2005), and form
a comparison portfolio of other no-load, equity funds. In a model-free setting, we construct
the long-short portfolio of (SRI funds-other funds) and report the monthly four-factor alphas
and betas in Table 4. We find that, even for the original GSL sample period, there is no sta-
tistically significant difference in alphas between the SRI and Non-SRI fund portfolios. The
results are similar when we extend the sample to 2013, as well as when we examine only the
post-GSL sample period of 2002-2013. Therefore, under our definition, the self reported SRI
mutual funds are essentially the same as other funds in their investment objectives and realized
performance in a model-free setting, and there is no discernable performance differences to
support the alternative hypothesis of (costly) SRI initiatives.
[Insert Figure 2 and Table 4 here]
12No portfolio holdings data prior to 2002 is available. Geczy et al. (2005) report 34 mutual funds that identify
themselves as SRI funds. We are able to match all of them with data on portfolio holdings. Some funds have
added portfolios or classes of shares under the same investment principle after December 2001. As a result, our
sample consists of 47 portfolios.
13In untabulated results, we also compute the differences in mean SR Scores, by category, between GSL and
control samples. The difference is not statistically significant in all but the Environment and Sin categories. In
the Environment/Sin category, the GSL sample portfolio have a higher/lower SR Score than the control sample.
Detailed results are available upon request.
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3.4. Temporary Abnormal Returns Following SR Rating Changes
To further isolate the effect of investors’ SRI preferences from other risk-related confounding
factors, we analyze the return changes around SR Score changes at the indidivual stock level
in an event study setting. To do so, for each stock and SR Category (including the Overall
Score), we first identify all the years where the SR Score decrease by one point or more (i.e.
lose at least one strength criteria or add at least one concerns). Because the ESGSTAT database
is updated at the end of each year and covers all developments in the current year, if there is
a change in the SR Score in the current year, we choose December as the event month and the
whole year as the event year. Next, for all event months, we compute the monthly four-factor
alphas per Eq. 3, using return and factor data in the previous 36 months. Next, for each stock
in the event sample, given the Score category c, event month m in event year t, we compute
the annual cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as the sum of monthly alphas:
CARc,t =
11∑
j=0
αc,m−i (4)
In order to minimize any potential look-ahead bias in the CAR estimation, we also compute
the average difference in raw realized returns in a given year by substrating the average returns
of firms that do not experience any SR Score decrease event from those of the event firms.14
We plot the time series of the average CAR for the Overall SR Score change event from t − 1
to t + 1 in Fig 4 and report the average CAR for all categories from t − 1 to t + 5 in Panel A
of Table 5. We also report the average raw return difference for the Overall SR Score change
event in Panel B of Table 5.
[Insert Figure 4 and Table 5 here]
Both Fig 4 and Table 5 provide further support for Hypothesis 1. First, in the short term,
14We report the difference for the Overall SR Score only. Results for other categories are similar to the alphas and
are available upon request.
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decreases in the SR Scores are associated with significantly negative CARs persisting up to
two years after the events. For example, firms with declines in the Overall SR Score have, on
average, -2.19% CAR in the event year t, -3.21% in the following year t+1, and -2.61% the year
after that (t+2). The average CARs are significantly negative in the event year t for five out of
the eight individual categories. The average CARs are significantly negative for six individual
categories in t + 1 and three categories in t + 2. Moreover, none of the CARs are statistically
different from zero in the year t − 1 prior to the event year, indicating that the negative CARs
in year t are indeed associated with the events. Next, in the long term, the CARs invariably
revert to zero after two to three years. With the exception of the Employment category, none
of the Score categories have CARs statistically different from zero beyond t + 2. This suggests
that the SRI-related preference shocks are probably temporary and is often triggered by key
SR events themselves. Moreover, the raw returns in Panel B of Table 5 follow the same pattern
as the CARs in the first row of Panel A, suggesting that our estimation of CARs is not subject to
much look-ahead bias.
4. Economic Mechanism: Wealth-Dependent Preference Shifts
The results in the previous section establish two facts. First, high-SR stocks have higher alphas,
but these alphas are temporary, varying both across time and across different SR categories.
Second, high- and low-SR firms have similar cash flow characteristics. Taken together, they
suggest that the alpha differences likely result from temporary differences in discount rates
rather than from cash flow channels. This section formulates and tests a hypothesis about the
source of discount rate differences over time. In particular, we argue that consumers view
SRI as a luxury good, and investing in “good” stocks are discretionary in nature: Suppose
that the preference for investing in high-SR stocks (versus investing in regular stocks) is time
varying and dependent on aggregate wealth. During periods when household wealth is high,
households can consequently afford to be SRI-conscious. That is, they can afford to temporar-
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ily deviate from the full-universe mean-variance efficient frontier and re-optimize based on a
smaller universe consisting of high-SR stocks. This drives up demand for these “good” stocks
and, ceteris paribus, results in higher realized alphas. However, during periods of low house-
hold wealth, households need to curb their discretionary spending in order to meet their basic,
subsistence-based consumption. From a portfolio perspective, this means shifting back to the
full mean-variance frontier and causing the demand for “good” stocks to drop, leading to lower
realized alphas. We summarize this argument in the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5 In the presence of unexpected preference shocks that favor high-SR firms during
good economic periods of high household wealth, the alphas of such firms will be higher than
those of low-SR firms during good times due to higher demand. By contrast, during bad economic
times, high-SR firms will have lower alphas than low-SR firms due to decreased investor demand.
To test this hypothesis, we construct two indicators of good economic times using cyclicality-
adjusted real P/E ratios from Shiller (2005), and one-year real GDP growth projections from
the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Each month between 1993 and 2013 is classified as
in good economic times if either of these measures fall in the upper half of their respective
10-year rolling distributions. We then construct three equal-weighted portfolios:
• Good: Stocks with Overall SR Rating in the top decile
• Bad: Stocks with Overall SR Rating in the top decile
• Regular: Stocks with Overall SR Rating not in the top decile
We then obtain the time-series of Fama-French three-factor+momentum alphas for each of
the portfolio using 3-year rolling regressions on monthly returns similar to Section 3.2. We
first overlay the alphas good, bad and (good-bad) portfolios with the indicators of good times
in Figure 5. We report the average alphas in these sub-periods in Table 6. This figure clearly
demonstrates that the alpha difference is more pronounced during good economic times (the
shaded regions). In particular, good stocks earn much higher alphas than bad stocks during
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the “good times” of 1990s and 2010-2013. They earn similar alphas during “regular times”
between 2003 and 2007 and significantly lower alphas than bad stocks during the financial
crisis of 2007-2009.
[Insert Figure 5 and Table 6 here]
Next, we insert the good time indicators It as dummies in a standard time-series regression:
αp,t = a + bIt + εt (5)
where αp,t is the (good-bad) or (good-regular) portfolio alphas. We fit the regression using
monthly data between 1993-2013 and compute Newey-West standard errors by treating the
periods as continuous and use 12 lags. The results are reported in Panel C of Table 6. Again, the
tables confirm the observation from the figures: the coefficient estimate for It is significantly
positive in all six specifications, indicating that demand for high-SR stocks is indeed higher
during good times, as reflected by the higher alphas for the good portfolio compared to both
bad and regular portfolios.
We then directly compare SRI with luxury goods. To do so, we first construct two series of
luxury good consumption and luxury retail sales:
• Luxury PCE: NIPA-based (annual series) growth in real per capita consumption expendi-
tures in jewelry and watches.
• Luxury sales: Quarterly series of real US sales growth of five leading luxury retailers
including Tiffany, Saks Fifth Avenue, Gucci, LVMH and Bulgari. This is done in a similar
fashion as Aït-Sahalia et al. (2004).
We then compute the annual and quarterly averages alphas of the (good-bad) and (good-
regular) portfolios and plot them alongside the luxury consumption/sales series, in Figure 6.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
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From the figures above, it is apparent that SR alphas have high correlations with both luxury
consumption and sales growth. First, the (good-bad) alpha is highly correlated with PCE in
jewelry and watches from NIPA, with a correlation coefficient=0.528. In addition, the spread is
also significantly correlated with real luxury sales with a coefficient of 0.329. This result further
suggests that the performance wedge between “good” and “bad” stocks are attributable to the
demand side, i.e. to the shifting of investors’ SRI preferences, rather than to cash-flow-related
explanations. The luxury-good-like performance of SRI suggests that such preference shifts are
related to aggregate wealth.
5. Conclusion
We provide a comprehensive analysis of the returns and risks of socially responsible investing,
utilizing a unique, firm-level database on social responsibility ratings. We advance four hy-
pothesis governing the behavior of realized and expected returns of stocks with different levels
of social responsibility, and perform empirical tests that supports the hypothesis that alpha
differences are induced by shocks to investors’ preferences and firms’ production. In an event
study setting, we show that reductions in firms’ social responsibility ratings lead to significantly
lower annual cumulative abnormal returns of up to two years. This result, coupled with our
finding that the focus of SRI evolves over time from environment to corporate governance cat-
egories, suggests further that the alpha differences are driven by temporary preference shocks
that transitions between different SR categories. We provide further evidence indicating that
these differences are induced by time-varying, wealth-dependent shocks to investors’ prefer-
ences, which result in high-SR stocks behaving in a fashion akin to luxury goods. The alpha
difference between high- and low-SR stocks are significantly more pronounced during good
economic times, and is significantly correlated with both luxury consumption from NIPA and
the sales growth of luxury-good retailers.
We plan to incorporate two significant additions in the upcoming version of the paper.
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First, we develop a model with wealth-dependent investor preferences and take the model
directly to the firm-level data to further illustrate the economic mechanism behind the SRI-
related preference shifts over time. Second, to explain the shifts in SRI alphas over different
categories, we plan to directly quantify firm-level SRI shocks using textual analysis methods
on firm disclosures.
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Figure 1: Mean Portfolio SR Scores for Top and Bottom Deciles
The top figure displays the time series of monthly Fama-French four-factor alphas for the top- and bottom-decile
portfolios sorted on the overall SR Score, defined in Eq. 2 of the text, from December 1993 to December 2013.
The bottom figure displays the time series of mean annual SR scores for the top and bottom deciles from 1991 to
2011. Decile 1 portfolio consists of the stocks with the lowest SR ratings, and Decile 10 portfolio consists of stocks
with the highest SR ratings. The sample consists of S&P 500 component stocks from 1991 to 2000, Russell 1000
stocks from 2001 to 2002, and Russell 3000 stocks from 2003 to 2013. All alphas are estimated using 36-month
rolling regressions, where each stock is required to have at least 6 months of return data available.
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Figure 2: SR Score for GSL Fund Holdings
This figure displays the mean quarterly SR scores for the portfolio holdings of mutual funds that are self identified
as socially responsible and reported in Geczy et al. (2005), as well as the mean SR score for the holdings of all
other no-load equity mutual funds. The mean SR score is computed as the average of the overall SR score, defined
in Eq. 2 of the text, of all stocks within the mutual fund portfolios that are within the MSCI coverage universe.
Our GSL sample consists of 47 portfolios belonging to 34 socially responsible mutual funds, and our comparison
(Non-GSL) sample consists of 8,453 portfolios belonging to 1,312 no-load equity mutual funds.
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Figure 3: Time Series of Long-Short Alphas in Different SR Categories
The top figure displays the time series of monthly Fama-French four-factor alphas for the long-short portfolios that
buy the equally-weighted Decile 10 portfolio, and sell the equally-weighted Decile 1 portfolio, in the individual SR
categories of Environment, Governance and Product, from December 1993 to December 2011. Decile 1 portfolio
consists of the stocks with the lowest SR ratings, and Decile 10 portfolio consists of stocks with the highest SR
ratings. The sample consists of S&P 500 component stocks from 1991 to 2000, Russell 1000 stocks from 2001 to
2002, and Russell 3000 stocks from 2003 to 2011. All alphas are estimated using 36-month rolling regressions,
where each stock is required to have at least 6 months of return data available.
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Figure 4: Time Series of Alphas Before and After SR Score Decrease
This figure displays the time series of mean monthly Fama-French four-factor alphas from one year before (t −1)
to one year after (t + 1) the event when the firm’s overall SR score, computed per Eq. 2 of the text, decreases
by more than one point during current year (t). The sample consists of S&P 500 component stocks from 1991
to 2000, Russell 1000 stocks from 2001 to 2002, and Russell 3000 stocks from 2003 to 2011. All alphas are
estimated using 36-month rolling regressions with up to 217 observations per stock, and each stock is required
to have at least 6 months of return data available.
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Figure 5: Alphas for Top and Bottom SR Decile Portfolios and the (Top-Bottom) Portfolio
The top figure displays the time series of monthly Fama-French four-factor alphas for the top- and bottom-decile
portfolios sorted on the overall SR Score, defined in Eq. 2 of the text, from December 1993 to December 2013.
The bottom figure displays the (Decile 10-Decile 1) portfolio alphas over the same period. Decile 1 portfolio
consists of the stocks with the lowest SR ratings, and Decile 10 portfolio consists of stocks with the highest SR
ratings. The sample consists of S&P 500 component stocks from 1991 to 2000, Russell 1000 stocks from 2001
to 2002, and Russell 3000 stocks from 2003 to 2013. The shaded area corresponds to “good economic times”
defined using either long-term P/E ratios or GDP growth projections from Survey of Professional Forecasters. See
Section 4 for details. All alphas are estimated using 36-month rolling regressions, where each stock is required
to have at least 6 months of return data available.
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Figure 6: Correlation between (Good-Bad) Portfolio Alphas and Luxury Consumption
The top panel of this figure plots the annual (average of monthly) alphas of the (good-bad) portfolio against
the annual growth rates in real per capita personal consumption expenditure growth in jewelry and watches,
obtained from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA). The bottom panel plots the quarterly (average
of monthly) alphas of the (good-bad) portfolio against the quarterly revenue growth rates of five leading luxury
retailers including Tiffany, Saks Fifth Avenue, Gucci, LVMH and Bulgari, computed per Aït-Sahalia et al. (2004).
The sample consists of S&P 500 component stocks from 1991 to 2000, Russell 1000 stocks from 2001 to 2002,
and Russell 3000 stocks from 2003 to 2013. All alphas are estimated using 36-month rolling regressions, where
each stock is required to have at least 6 months of return data available.
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Table 1: Top and Bottom Firms in SR Scores and Persistence in Scores
Panel A of this table presents the names of the top 10 and bottom 10 firms in terms of the overall SR score,
computed per Eq. 2 of the text, in the year of 1993 and 2010, respectively. Panel B of the table reports the cross-
section mean and standard deviation of the AR(1) coefficient of the SR percentile scores. The sample consists of
S&P 500 component stocks from 1991 to 2000, Russell 1000 stocks from 2001 to 2002, and Russell 3000 stocks
from 2003 to 2011. The AR(1) coefficients are computed once per stock, using all available score data in the
sample period. The stock is excluded from the sample if there are gaps between coverage years.
Panel A: Top and Bottom 10 Firms in Overall SR Scores, 1993 and 2010
1993 2010
Top 10 Bottom 10 Top 10 Bottom 10
Lotus Development Corp Occidental Petroleum Texas Instruments L-3 Communications
Herman Miller Inc International Paper Co Johnson & Johnson PulteGroup
CoreStates Financial UNISYS Corp Avon Products Halliburton
Apple Computer Inc McDonnell Douglas Xerox Corp Cintas Corp
Polaroid USX Corp AMD Corp Stericycle Inc
Xerox Corp Marathon Group Procter & Gamble Lorillard Corp
General Mills NL Industries Inc Starbucks Monsanto Corp
Whole Foods Market Phelps Dodge Corp General Mills KBR Inc
Ben & Jerry’s American Cyanamid Co Northern Trust Las Vegas Sands Corp
Sara Lee Corp Lockheed Corp Estee Lauder Casella Waste Systems
Panel B: Persistence of SR Percentile Scores Across Years
Score Catetory Cross-Section Summary AR(1) Coefficients
No. of Obs. Mean StDev
Overall 791 0.535 0.258
Community 790 0.547 0.232
Diversity 785 0.671 0.236
Employment 790 0.515 0.257
Environment 790 0.629 0.214
Governance 791 0.370 0.278
Human Right 790 0.712 0.172
Product 790 0.539 0.255
Sin 34 0.643 0.141
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
This table presents the portfolio mean and median of firm-level characteristics outlined in Section 2 of the text. All mean and median values
are computed as the cross-section mean/median of the time series averages of each firm in the respective portfolio, sorted on 9 SR Score
categories. Decile 1 portfolio consists of the stocks with the lowest SR ratings, and Decile 10 portfolio consists of stocks with the highest SR
ratings. The sample consists of S&P 500 component stocks from 1991 to 2000, Russell 1000 stocks from 2001 to 2002, and Russell 3000
stocks from 2003 to 2011.
Score Category Score Decile Size ($mln) Book-to-Market Price-to-Earning Dividend Payout Debt-to-Equity
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Overall 1 (Low) 2887.535 281.144 0.816 0.600 22.931 12.252 0.258 0.000 0.907 0.129
10 (High) 2183.508 235.500 0.793 0.566 14.289 12.633 0.088 0.000 0.642 0.131
Community 1 (Low) 2034.618 147.450 0.786 0.570 27.191 12.109 0.217 0.000 0.709 0.119
10 (High) 2868.022 233.289 0.771 0.570 13.760 13.039 0.043 0.000 0.553 0.123
Diversity 1 (Low) 3033.714 273.064 0.792 0.589 24.247 12.777 0.289 0.000 1.012 0.123
10 (High) 845.436 68.628 0.787 0.586 22.593 11.999 0.266 0.000 0.617 0.114
Employment 1 (Low) 2041.021 146.286 0.831 0.597 26.150 11.742 0.326 0.000 0.857 0.132
10 (High) 2652.891 265.745 0.721 0.549 11.019 13.750 0.168 0.000 0.532 0.115
Environment 1 (Low) 3056.573 305.209 0.650 0.504 23.591 14.784 0.158 0.000 0.520 0.113
10 (High) 2612.676 303.676 0.917 0.605 15.590 12.013 0.071 0.000 0.692 0.135
Governance 1 (Low) 1804.888 123.064 0.803 0.582 32.181 11.516 0.221 0.000 0.725 0.121
10 (High) 2263.463 165.763 0.848 0.571 25.043 12.500 0.177 0.000 0.667 0.109
Human Right 1 (Low) 2275.900 172.213 0.785 0.567 30.241 12.149 0.203 0.000 0.720 0.120
10 (High) 2631.562 378.959 0.834 0.581 17.116 14.573 0.146 0.000 0.431 0.165
Product 1 (Low) 2850.583 228.941 0.903 0.656 36.050 12.031 0.293 0.000 0.794 0.145
10 (High) 3133.562 307.106 0.851 0.571 16.990 12.692 0.167 0.000 0.904 0.135
Sin 1 (Low) 2040.616 147.750 0.785 0.570 29.170 12.119 0.212 0.000 0.705 0.119
10 (High) 1828.982 225.087 0.742 0.584 17.261 11.889 0.656 0.000 0.659 0.109
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Table 3: Portfolio Alphas and Betas for Different Social Responsibility Rating Categories
Panel A of this table presents the mean of monthly Fama-French four-factor alphas for the top- and bottom-decile portfolios sorted on 9 SR
Score categories. Panel B displays the corresponding betas for the (Low SR-High SR) portfolio. Decile 1 portfolio consists of the stocks with
the lowest SR ratings, and Decile 10 portfolio consists of stocks with the highest SR ratings. The sample consists of S&P 500 component
stocks from 1991 to 2000, Russell 1000 stocks from 2001 to 2002, and Russell 3000 stocks from 2003 to 2011. All alphas and betas are
estimated using 36-month rolling regressions with up to 217 observations per stock, and each stock is required to have at least 6 months of
return data available. The numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
Panel A: Alphas for Decile and Spread Portfolios
Score Decile SR Score Category
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Com Div Emp Env Gov Hum Pro Sin Overall
1 (Low) 0.00269*** 0.00304*** 0.00261*** 0.00079 0.00236*** 0.00286*** 0.00136*** 0.00268*** 0.00196*
(3.59) (3.39) (3.69) (1.21) (3.94) (3.50) (3.49) (3.91) (2.09)
10 (High) 0.00223*** 0.00201*** 0.00282*** 0.00394** 0.00672*** 0.00416 0.00453*** 0.00181 0.00350***
(4.65) (4.06) (5.61) (3.22) (4.77) (1.04) (4.46) (1.20) (5.58)
Low-High 0.00045 0.00104 -0.00020 -0.00315* -0.00436** -0.00130 -0.00318** 0.00087 -0.00154**
(0.57) (1.28) (-0.40) (-2.18) (-3.32) (-0.31) (-2.88) (0.81) (-2.68)
Panel B: Betas for the (Low-High) Portfolio
β SR Score Category
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Com Div Emp Env Gov Hum Pro Sin Overall
Mkt 0.151*** 0.138*** 0.0721** 0.00686 0.122** -0.182 -0.0948*** 0.0318 0.150***
(9.53) (7.20) (2.78) (0.17) (2.83) (-1.94) (-4.30) (0.80) (6.16)
SmB 0.409*** 0.445*** 0.107* 0.0412 -0.0166 0.512** -0.123*** 0.0293 0.0852**
(14.94) (11.08) (2.33) (0.88) (-0.18) (2.68) (-3.65) (1.10) (2.90)
HmL -0.0470 0.0445 0.144*** 0.234*** 0.183 0.0129 0.512*** -0.0143 0.222**
(-1.16) (1.15) (4.86) (5.84) (1.82) (0.07) (6.28) (-0.34) (3.29)
UmD 0.0176 0.0470 -0.0737** -0.107** -0.0941 0.0146 0.00480 0.0781 0.0101
(0.78) (1.47) (-3.23) (-2.74) (-1.47) (0.14) (0.09) (1.39) (0.36)
No. Obs 217 217 217 217 217 203 217 217 217
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Table 4: Differences in Alphas Between Socially Responsible and Other Mutual Funds
This table presents the four-factor alphas and betas of the long-short portfolio that buys an equally-weighted
portfolio of self-reported socially responsible mutual funds, studied in Geczy et al. (2005), and sells an equally-
weighted portfolio of no-load equity mutual funds without such a focus, in five different sample periods. Column
(3) corresponds to the Geczy et al. (2005) sample period. Our GSL sample consists of 34 socially responsible
mutual funds, and our comparison (Non-GSL) sample consists 1,312 no-load equity mutual funds.
Portfolio: EW (GSL-Non GSL) Sample Periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1963-2013 1993-2013 1963-2001 1993-2001 2002-2013
Alpha -0.000158 0.0000866 -0.0000903 0.000923 -0.000468
(-0.24) (0.24) (-0.10) (1.28) (-1.55)
β
Mkt 0.0163 0.0504*** 0.0131 0.0364 0.0229**
(1.07) (5.70) (0.62) (1.81) (2.86)
SmB -0.0938*** -0.0568*** -0.113*** -0.112*** 0.0246
(-4.40) (-4.95) (-4.15) (-5.67) (1.79)
HmL 0.00926 -0.0914*** 0.00956 -0.154*** -0.0565***
(0.40) (-7.52) (0.30) (-5.90) (-4.38)
UmD 0.0208 0.0237** 0.0185 0.0145 0.0271***
(1.42) (3.25) (0.88) (1.11) (4.13)
No. of Obs 522 248 378 104 144
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Table 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Before and After SR Score Decreases
Panel A of this table reports the mean annual cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) from one year before (t − 1) to five years after (t + 5)
the event when the firm’s SR score in a given category decreases by more than one point during current year (t). Panel B of this table
reports the difference between the mean raw annual returns of all firms whose overall SR score decreases by more than one point, and that
of all other firms, during the same six-year span. The sample consists of S&P 500 component stocks from 1991 to 2000, Russell 1000 stocks
from 2001 to 2002, and Russell 3000 stocks from 2003 to 2011. The CARs are computed using monthly alphas per Eq. (4) of the text. All
alphas are estimated using 36-month rolling regressions with up to 217 observations per stock, and each stock is required to have at least
6 months of return data available. The numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
Score Category Annual CAR
t − 1 t t + 1 t + 2 t + 3 t + 4 t + 5
Overall -0.00171 -0.0219*** -0.0321*** -0.0261*** -0.00736 -0.0143 -0.00089*
(-0.54) (-6.79) (-5.63) (-4.43) (-1.39) (-1.16) (-2.23)
Community 0.00146 0.00170 -0.0690*** 0.00414 -0.0213 -0.0233 -0.00667
(0.22) (0.26) (-4.81) (0.34) (-1.82) (-1.95) (-0.66)
Diversity 0.00822 -0.0207*** -0.0273** -0.0289** -0.0145 -0.00663 -0.0172**
(1.54) (-4.14) (-3.07) (-3.12) (-1.72) (-1.12) (-3.04)
Employment -0.00887 -0.0153** -0.0144 -0.0359*** -0.0249** 0.00283 -0.000314
(-1.77) (-3.02) (-1.57) (-3.62) (-2.75) (0.33) (-0.04)
Environment -0.00377 -0.0235*** -0.0131* -0.0112 -0.0289 -0.0264* -0.0130
(-0.55) (-3.50) (-2.00) (-0.79) (-1.27) (-2.41) (-1.21)
Governance -0.00687 -0.0271*** -0.0296*** -0.0247*** 0.00801 -0.0106 -0.00461
(-1.79) (-6.60) (-4.41) (-3.46) (1.22) (-1.88) (-0.93)
Human Right 0.0228 -0.0198 -0.0193** -0.0270 -0.0661 -0.0111 -0.0135
(1.69) (-1.20) (-3.25) (-1.15) (-1.51) (-0.45) (-0.57)
Product -0.00473 -0.0136* -0.0042* -0.00888 -0.0138 -0.00160 -0.00924
(-0.66) (-2.06) (-2.35) (-0.71) (-1.10) (-0.15) (-0.90)
Sin -0.0543 0.0210 0.0668 0.0135 0.0603 -0.0108 -0.00876
(-1.40) (0.62) (1.40) (0.32) (1.26) (-0.49) (-0.53)
Panel B: Raw Return Difference (Avg. Event Returns-Avg. Nonevent Returns in the Same Period)
Overall 0.02230 -0.03610 -0.02883 -0.00310 0.01500 -0.00170 -0.00800
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Table 6: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Before and After SR Score Decreases
Panels A and B of this table presents the mean of monthly Fama-French four-factor alphas for the top- and bottom-
decile portfolios, as well as the (top-bottom) portfolio, during good and normal times defined using either long-
term P/E ratios or GDP growth projections from Survey of Professional Forecasters, respectively. See Section 4
for details. Panel C reports coefficient estimates from Regression 5 of the text. Decile 1 portfolio consists of the
stocks with the lowest SR ratings, and Decile 10 portfolio consists of stocks with the highest SR ratings. The
sample consists of S&P 500 component stocks from 1991 to 2000, Russell 1000 stocks from 2001 to 2002, and
Russell 3000 stocks from 2003 to 2013. All alphas and betas are estimated using 36-month rolling regressions
with up to 241 observations per stock, and each stock is required to have at least 6 months of return data available.
The numbers in brackets are t-statistics.
Panel A: Average Alphas in Good time defined by Shiller P/E
Good Time Normal Time
Bad (Decile 1) Good (Decile 10) Diff Bad Good Diff
Alpha -0.00227*** 0.000888*** 0.00315*** 0.00345*** 0.00343*** -0.000026
(-2.85) (2.51) (4.12) (5.08) (4.15) (-0.04)
Good Time Normal Time
Rest (Decile 1-9) Good (Decile 10) Diff Rest (Decile 1-9) Good Diff
Alpha -0.000682 0.000888* 0.00157** 0.00425*** 0.00343*** -0.000822
(-1.08) (2.51) (2.88) (5.50) (4.15) (-1.35)
No. Obs 108 108 108 133 133 133
Panel B: Average Alphas in Good time defined by SPF
Good Time Normal Time
Bad (Decile 1) Good (Decile 10) Diff Bad Good Diff
Alpha 0.00304*** 0.00416*** 0.00112*** 0.000312 0.00179*** 0.00147
(3.07) (3.69) (3.27) (0.33) (3.13) (1.95)
Good Time Normal Time
Rest (Decile 1-9) Good (Decile 10) Diff Rest (Decile 1-9) Good Diff
Alpha 0.00341*** 0.00416*** 0.000748* 0.00167 0.00179** 0.000116
(2.89) (3.66) (2.18) (1.86) (3.13) (0.20)
No. Obs 61 61 61 180 180 180
Panel C: Alpha Regressions with Good Time Dummy
High SR vs. Low SR High SR vs. Regular SR
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Shiller 0.00318** 0.00299** 0.00239** 0.00286***
(3.05) (3.10) (2.96) (3.62)
SPF 0.00186 0.00140 0.00236** 0.00176
(1.86) (1.70) (3.21) (1.81)
No. Obs 241 241 241 241 241 241
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